Clone-Slicer: Detecting Domain Specific Binary Code Clones through Program Slicing

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ABSTRACT
Detecting code clones is important for various software engineering development and debugging tasks. In particular, binary code clone detection can have significant uses in the context of legacy applications that are already deployed in several critical domains.

In this paper, we present a novel framework, Clone-Slicer, for identifying domain-specific binary code clones (e.g., pointer-related code) through program slicing. Our approach first eliminates non-domain-related instructions through program slicing, and then applies deep learning-based algorithm to model code samples as numerical vectors for the remaining binary instructions. We then use clustering algorithms to aggregate code clones, and use formal analysis to verify validity of code clones. Our experimental results show the Clone-Slicer can swiftly identify up tp 43.64% code clones and cut the time-to-solution by 32.96% compared to previously proposed code clone detectors.

CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Software testing and debugging; • Security and privacy → Software security engineering.

KEYWORDS
Program slicing; Code Clones; Machine learning; Binary analysis

ACM Reference Format:

1 INTRODUCTION
Understanding software and detecting duplicate code fragments is an important task, especially in large code bases [15, 24, 29]. Detecting similar code fragments, usually referred to as code clones, can be helpful in discovering vulnerability, refactoring code and removing unnecessary code segments. Prior approaches have been proposed for code clone detection that take advantage of token subsequence matching, text/tree comparison or control flow graph analysis [6, 21, 23]. While a number of existing clone detection algorithms target source code [7, 25, 41], we note that legacy applications exist in several real-world domains and have been in deployment for a number of years in production systems including airspace, military and banking (where only binary executables are available). Also, binary code clone detection is more difficult compared to source code-level detectors that leverage rich structural information such as syntax trees and variable names made available through the source lines of program code.

Prior work on binary code clones have adapted source code-based techniques and are usually oblivious to the specific domain of applications on which clone detection is useful. For instance, Sæbø et al. [33] have proposed a code clone detection algorithm based on characteristic vectors and normalize the assembly-level instructions to detect more clones. Xu et al. [43] propose a graph embedding approach using deep neural network to detect vulnerable binaries that are compiled for different computer architectures or platforms. While these prior work outline methods to detect code clones, it is more important to tailor code clone detection based on specific application areas to increase usefulness of detecting them.

To improve the application of detecting code clones, we introduce domain-specific code clone detection, which can be used to detect code clones for certain types of applications. This approach takes advantage of the knowledge within a specific domain and tailors code clone detection approach based on that domain. For instance, since pointers and pointer-related operations widely exist in real-world applications and are often behind security bugs [9, 11, 34], detecting code clones related to pointers are of great significance for application security. Thus, detecting pointer-related code clones is one such domain-specific application that can significantly improve the scalability for pointer-specific application analysis. Similarly, tracking code that depends on external inputs is another example of domain-specific code.

In this paper, we propose Clone-Slicer, a novel framework for domain specific code clone detection in binaries. In particular, we select pointer analysis (that determines pointer safety) to present our methodology and demonstrate the soundness of our approach in this work. We first deploy a lightweight pointer tainting method in binary to find pointer-related instructions that can potentially change the array boundary conditions. Then we leverage forward program slicing and binary rewriting to remove pointer-irrelevant instructions in order to detect pointer-related code clones. By doing so, we are able to improve the number of code clones detected and their time-to-solution in determining applicability on a specific domain (removing unnecessary checking code surrounding pointers that are already deemed safe). We note that this enables rapid security analysis by ignoring binary instructions that are irrelevant to pointer-related code.
The contributions of our paper are summarized as follows:

(1) We propose Clone-Slicer, a domain-specific binary code clone detection framework. Given a domain of interest, Clone-Slicer automatically identifies domain-related binary instructions through tainting frameworks, and then performs code clone detection to enable rapid security analysis.

(2) Clone-Slicer leverages program slicing to remove domain-irrelevant instructions to find code clones of interest within the application domain. Clone-Slicer deploys formal analysis to perform a closed-loop operation and introduces a clone verification mechanism to formally verify if identified clone samples are indeed clones within the domain context.

(3) We implement a prototype of Clone-Slicer and evaluate pointer analysis domain using real-world applications from SPEC2006 benchmarks suite [1]. Our results show Clone-Slicer can swiftly identify up tp 43.64% code clones and cut the time-to-solution for (the time spent to formally verify the redundancy of array bound checks) by 32.96% compared to prior work [45].

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we survey related work. We illustrate the overview of Clone-Slicer and how we design and implement our system, respectively. We evaluate Clone-Slicer and show our experimental results in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our conclusions and future work.

2 RELATED WORK

Code clone detection. Code clone detection techniques can generally be classified into several categories. String matching-based techniques [5, 6, 13] perform lightweight program transformations and utilize code similarity measurement through comparing text sequences of text. Such text-based techniques are limited in scalability for large code bases and only find exact match code clone pairs. Second, tree- or token-based clone detection [7, 26, 41] are performed by parsing program into tokens or generate abstract syntax tree (AST) representation of the source program. Consequently, tree- or token-based approaches usually more robust against code-specific changes. Some well-known tools in this category include CC-Finder [23], DECKARD [21] and CP-Miner [29]. Learning based approaches have also been developed for code similarity detection. White et al. [42] proposed a deep neural network (DNN) based code clone detection in source code. Komondoor et al. [25] also make the use of program slicing and dependence analysis to find non-contiguous code clones. But such approaches typically find isomorphic subgraphs from program dependency graph in order to identify code clones, for which computing such graphs is typically more expensive. Also, the approaches mentioned above are still demonstrated on the source code-level and not on binaries. Gemini [43] use DNN to detect cross-platform code clones in binaries. But it is limited in scope to detect clones within a single function compiled in different platforms.

Statistical method and Formal analysis. In this paper, we make use of both machine learning and formal analysis for code clone detection and verification. Prior work have studied bug/vulnerabilities using learning based approaches [20, 32], StatSym [46] and SARRE [28] propose frameworks combining statistical and formal analysis for vulnerable path discovery. SIMBER [44] proposes a statistical inference framework to eliminate redundant bound checks and improve the performance of applications without sacrificing security. However, SIMBER is limited in scalability and does not use machine learning algorithms. Similarly, Clone-Hunter [45] also takes advantage of binary code clone detection for accelerated bound check removal. However, Clone-Hunter uses normalization on instruction operand for vector embedding, which may omit relevant information and does not use domain-specific knowledge (e.g., pointers) for improved clone detection. In this paper, we use deep learning based language models for vector embedding instead.

Deep Learning and Language Modeling. The state-of-the-art Deep Learning algorithms have been used as new approaches for language modeling [3, 22]. Traditionally, natural language processing (NLP) in particular has utilized deep learning to do software engineering tasks such as text/code suggestions, text classification and so on [3, 14, 19]. For instance, recurrent neural network (RNN) is known as a capable approach for modeling sequential information [17, 36]. Recently, such techniques has been applied on modeling program source code fragments. White et al. [42] propose a deep learning-based detection approach for source code clone detection using RNN. It develops an automated framework to extract source code features at both lexical and syntax levels. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to demonstrate improved code clone detection in a scalable way using deep learning and clustering algorithms, while making sure that clones are verified through formal analysis in the back end.

3 SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

In this section, we present the overview and details of our system design along with its modules, and show how our system is implemented. The kernel of Clone-Slicer is shown in Figure 1.

For a given application binary, Clone-Slicer first employs static binary program slicing and binary rewriting to remove pointer irrelevant instructions. We disassemble binary executables and work with the resulting assembly code (Section 3.1). To detect code clones in binaries, we leverage deep learning-based approach to generate feature vectors for each instruction sequence and embed them into vector space (Section 3.2). After we obtain feature vectors, we deploy clustering algorithm to form clusters and find code clone pairs. Note that we also use different code similarity thresholds to further increase the number of detected code clones (more details in Section 3.3). Since we adopt sliding window-based method to generate code regions, we perform quick post-processing to consolidate overlapping code clones.

We use binary symbolic execution to verify whether the code clone samples are safe in terms of array bound checks. We deploy a selective sampling method to further verify the validity of clone detection by selecting a random subset of samples within the cluster center and boundary regions, and perform binary symbolic execution on these samples. Section 3.4 describes our implementation in more detail.

3.1 Domain Specific Program Slicing

In pointer analysis domain, we aim to analyze each pointer in the program to ensure there is no issue like memory violation. Thus, only some certain types of instructions are related to the target pointer for further consideration, which can affect the base, offset or bound information of this pointer. In this paper, we use pointer tainting analysis to find such pointer-related instructions at a function-level granularity. Then, we deploy forward program slicing and binary rewriting to remove pointer irrelevant instructions.
To address this problem, Clone-Slicer first performs tainting analysis of the binary code and deploy program slicing in two steps:

(1) **Lightweight Pointer Tainting.** To select pointer related instructions, we utilize a lightweight pointer tainting mechanism. Typically, there are two types of instructions need to be tainted: Memory load operations moving data from memory to register; Store operations moving data from register to memory. We implemented the pointer tainting based on previous work [10, 39, 40]. Whenever a program performs memory operations using its data from registers and memory, such instructions need to be tainted through propagation. In particular, for each load instruction, the tainting is propagated from memory to register along the load path. Similarly, for each store instruction, the tainting is propagated from writing to the memory along the store path. Whenever two pointers are subtracted (e.g., offset computation), the resulting location is un-tainted. However, addition of two pointers still results in a pointer.

(2) **Program Slicing.** After we obtain all the target pointers and their corresponding pointer-related instructions, we use forward program slicing and binary rewriting to remove pointer-irrelevant instructions. To build a forward slice, we utilize control flow graph (CFG) and data dependency graph (DDG) to understand the dependency among all the tainted instructions. Forward slicing is then constructed starting with tainted targets in the program, and all of the data flows in this slice end at the target after traversing the entire CFG. We then are able to select all pointer-related instructions. For those instructions are pointer irrelevant, we simply rewrite them as nop using binary rewriting tools.

To remove pointer irrelevant instructions in binary executables, we deployed a Static Binary Rewriting tool Dyninst [37]. We instrumented a binary analysis framework angr [35] and develop a python script to construct CFG and DDG in binaries.

### 3.2 Vector Embedding using Deep Neural Networks

![Figure 2: An illustration of RNN. The input of each node is a one-hot vector representing the current term in the disassembly code corpus, and output is a probability distribution predicting the next term.](image)

3.2 Vector Embedding using Deep Neural Networks

We adopt a sliding window method to select different code regions for code clone analysis. The approach is implemented with two parameters: window size and stride. Window size defines the maximum length of code regions for consideration, while stride denotes the smallest increment of starting instruction address for subsequent sliding windows. Since we rewrite non-pointer related instructions as nop. We skip such nop instructions while we generate code regions and only count pointer related sliced instructions in the code regions.

Next, we leverage Deep Neural Network (DNN) to propose a solution to enable automated vector embedding. First, to obtain vector embedding for a given code region (that consists of an instruction sequence), we use Recursive Neural Network (RNN) to map each term in the binary instructions (e.g., opcodes and operands) to a vector embedding at lexical level, resulting in a signature vector for the code region.

**Embedding binary code at lexical level.** Consider a disassembly code corpus from a target program, with \( m \) distinct terms (e.g., different opcodes and operands) across the whole corpus. We use a RNN with \( n \) hidden nodes to convert each term in the code corpus into an embedding vector \( U \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m} \). RNN is known as an effective approach for modeling sequential information, such as sentences in texts or program code. Figure 2 presents the training process of our RNN model for binary code. The input \( x_t \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m} \) at time step \( t \) is a one-hot vector representation [38] corresponding to the current term, e.g., 'exa'. The hidden layer state vector, \( s_t \in \mathbb{R}^n \), stores the current state of the network at step \( t \) and captures the information that has already been calculated. Specifically, it can be obtained using the previous hidden state \( s_{t-1} \) at time step \( t-1 \) and the current input \( x_t \) at time step \( t \):

\[
s_t = f(Ux_t + Ws_{t-1})
\]

Function \( f \) is a nonlinear function, e.g., \( \tanh U \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m} \) and \( W \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n} \) are the shared parameters in all time steps.

The output, \( O_t \in \mathbb{R}^m \), is a vector of probabilities predicting the distribution of the next term in the code corpus [18]. It is calculated based on current state vector along with another shared parameter \( V \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n} \), i.e.,

\[
O_t = \text{softmax}(Vs_t)
\]

The parameters \( \{U, V, W\} \) are trained using back propagation through time (BPTT) method in our RNN network [8]. Once RNN training is complete, each term in the code corpus will have an unique embedding \( U \) from Equation (1), which comprises its semantic representation cross the corpus [4]. We compute such embeddings \( U \) to represent the terms of binary instructions at lexical level.

**Generating signature at syntax level.** We use Autoencoder to combine embeddings \( U \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m} \) of the terms from multiple instructions and to obtain a signature vector for a given code region. Autoencoder is widely used to generate vector space representations for a pairwise composed terms with two phases: encode phase and decode phase. It is a simple neural network with one input layer, one hidden layer and one output layer. As shown in Figure 3, we apply Autoencoder recursively to a sequence of terms, which is known as the Recursive Autoencoder (RAE). Let \( x_1, x_2 \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m} \) be the vector embeddings of two different terms, computed using RNN. During encode phase, the composed vector embeddings \( Z(x_1, x_2) \) is calculated by:

\[
Z(x_1, x_2) = f(W_1[x_1; x_2] + b_1),
\]

where \( [x_1; x_2] \in \mathbb{R}^{2n \times m} \) is the concatenation of \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \), \( W_1 \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 2nm} \) is the parameter matrix in encode phase, and \( b \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m} \) is the offset. Similar to RNN, \( f \) again is a nonlinear function, e.g., \( \tanh \).
we develop a python script to tokenize the disassembly code and with a sequence of 8 instructions. The greedy method is illustrated we adopt a greedy method [42] to train our RAE and recursively

Then, we continue to process the remaining instructions, e.g., Nodes 3.3.1 Definitions. We first formally give the definition of code similarity used in our code clone detection module.

Definition 3.1. Code Similarity. Given two Abstract Syntax 
Trees (AST) $T_1$ and $T_2$, which are representing two code fragments, the code similarity $S$ between them is defined as following:

$$S(T_1, T_2) = \frac{2S}{2S + L + R}$$  (6)

where $S$ is the number of shared nodes in $T_1$ and $T_2$, $L$ and $R$ are the different nodes in terms of the node types and number of nodes in $T_1$ and $T_2$ respectively.

3.3.2 Clone Detection. Given a group of feature vectors, we utilize Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) [12] and near-neighbor querying algorithm based on the euclidean distance between two vectors to cluster a vector group, where LSH can hash two similar vectors to the same hash value and helps near-neighbor querying algorithm to form clusters [16, 21]. Suppose two feature vectors $V_i$ and $V_j$ representing two code fragments $C_i$ and $C_j$ respectively. The code size (the total number of AST nodes) are denoted as $S(C_i)$ and $S(C_j)$. The euclidean distance $E([V_i; V_j])$ and hamming distance $H([V_i; V_j])$ between $V_i$ and $V_j$ are calculated as following:

$$E([V_i; V_j]) = ||V_i - V_j||^2$$  (7)
$$H([V_i; V_j]) = ||V_i - V_j||_1$$  (8)

The threshold used for clustering can be approximated using the euclidean distance and hamming distance between two feature vectors for two ASTs $T_1$ and $T_2$ as following:

$$E([V_i; V_j]) \geq \sqrt{H([V_i; V_j])} \approx \sqrt{L + R}$$  (9)

Based on the definition from Equation 3.1, we can derive that $\sqrt{L + R} = \sqrt{2(1 - S) \times ([T_1] + [T_2])}$, where $([T_1] + [T_2]) \geq 2 \times \min(S(C_i), S(C_j))$. Then, the threshold for the clustering procedure is defined as:

$$T = \sqrt{2(1 - S) \times \min(S(C_i), S(C_j))}$$  (10)

Then, given a feature vector group $V_i$, the threshold can be simplified as $2(1 - S) \times \min_{V \in V} \in S(V)$, where we use vector sizes to approximate tree sizes. The $S$ is the code similarity metric defined from Equation 3.1. Thus, code fragments $C_i$ and $C_j$ will be clustered together as code clones under a given code similarity $S$ if $E([V_i; V_j]) \leq T$.

3.3.3 Post-Processing. As described in previous section, we deploy a sliding window approach to generate code fragments for code clone detection. We note that this method can potentially create duplicated or overlapping code clones. To address this problem, we further eliminate such code clones and only preserve the largest code clones by computing the union of overlapping code clones. Assuming a code clone sample is denoted as $(c_1, c_2)$, where $c_1$ is the starting instruction address of the code and $c_2$ is the ending instruction address in the code fragment. Give two code clone samples $(c_1, c_2)$ and $(c'_1, c'_2)$, we only keep clone sample $(c_1, c_2)$ iff $c'_1 \geq c_1$ and $c'_2 \leq c_2$. On the other hand, we do not consolidate two code clone samples if $(c_1, c_2) \cap (c'_1, c'_2) \neq (c_1, c_2) \cup (c'_1, c'_2)$. This post-processing procedure is performed until all consolidated code clones are non-overlapping.

We implemented our clustering system with python and provide as a user-friendly interface in Linux command line, which can provide the options of code similarity $S$ for users.

3.4 Binary Symbolic Execution for Verification

Clone-Slicer makes use of clustering algorithms to identify binary code clones. In prior work Clone-Hunter [45], it uses binary code clone detection to assist removal of redundant array bound checks. Clone-Slicer can be further applied to the same task to remove
We later present our evaluation results in terms of the effective-verification module. We take advantage of the binary symbolic hmmer, sphinx3, bzip2 and lbm from SPEC2006 benchmark suite [1]. server with 12 GByte of main memory. The operating system is
elements are performed on a 2.54 GHz Intel Xeon(R) CPU E5540 8-core
4.1 Experiment Setup
We performed empirical experiments on Clone-Slicer. All experi-
3.4. Table 1 presents the runtime overhead due to pure symbolic execution on function-level, Clone-Hunter and Clone-Slicer. We observe that Clone-Slicer is able to improve the time-to-solution (the time spent to verify pointer memory safety)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>#Code Clones Clone-Slicer</th>
<th>%Improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bzip2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbm</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hmmer</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sphinx3</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>1,815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Comparison of number of code clones detected by Clone-Slicer and Clone-Hunter

winter only contains two code clone samples (since the smallest clus-

can be safely removed. To the contrary, the bound checks cannot be removed if the output from symbolic execution says that there are memory violation in the corresponding code snippet. We further conduct a case study applying the kernel of Clone-Slicer to redundant bound check removal to show the applications of Clone-Slicer (Section 4.4).

(2) Verification of memory safety: Since machine learning based clustering algorithm cannot offer any guarantees in terms of ensuring memory safety from all detected code clones. It is possible the code clone samples have different memory safety conditions in the same cluster. To address such issue, Clone-Slicer further executes a verification process. We select a random set of code clone samples from the cluster boundary within the same cluster and perform the same partial binary symbolic execution to check whether the memory safety conditions on these code clones are indeed similar. If the random code clones samples also turn out to be safe just as the seed code sample does, then we assume all the code clone samples are safe in the corresponding cluster.

We instrumented a binary analysis framework angr [35] for our verification module. We take advantage of the binary symbolic executor in angr to perform partial symbolic execution, which is beginning with the starting address and execute instructions within the specific code region to the end.

4 EVALUATION
In this section, we provide an overview of our experimental setup. We later present our evaluation results in terms of the effectiveness of code clone detection using our approach and the overhead of binary symbolic execution comparing to prior work, Clone-Hunter [45].

4.2 Code Clone Detection
We measured the number of code clones that are detected from Clone-Slicer using domain-specific knowledge (pointer safety, in our case). We conduct experiments in terms of the following: code clones quantity and the effect of relaxing the code similarity metric. We use the binary code clone detection algorithm proposed in Clone-Hunter as our baseline. For a fair comparison, we choose the same configuration to generate code regions with maximum sliding window size equals to 100 instructions (minimum window size = 2 instructions) and stride value of 4.

Table 2 shows the experiment results for each benchmark, the number of code clone detected using Clone-Hunter and Clone-Slicer, with code similarity thresholds equal to 1.00 and 0.90. First, we are able to increase the number of code clone detection while we relax the code similarity. Second, as we can say, Clone-Slicer is able to detect more code clones than Clone-Hunter among all the benchmarks, with the highest up to 43.64% improvement than Clone-Hunter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>#Code Clones Clone-Slicer</th>
<th>%Improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bzip2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>lbm</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>hmmer</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sphinx3</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>2,417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Comparison of number of code clones detected by Clone-Slicer and Clone-Hunter

Code Similarity Threshold, S = 1.00

Code Similarity Threshold, S = 0.90

4.3 Overhead of Binary Symbolic Execution
We evaluated the overhead of binary symbolic executors to check for pointer memory safety using Clone-Slicer, and compared the execution time with Pure Symbolic Execution on function-level (performing partial symbolic execution on each function as function-level overhead) and Clone-Hunter. Similarly, our baseline is the binary analysis framework angr [35].

For a fair comparison, we set up the same threshold for number of code samples used for verification as mentioned in Clone-Hunter, with a lower bound as 2 code clone samples (since the smallest cluster only contains two code clone samples) and 30% sampling rate for larger cluster as upper bound to randomly select code clone samples described in Section 3.4. Table 1 presents the runtime overhead due to pure symbolic execution on function-level, Clone-Hunter and Clone-Slicer. We observe that Clone-Slicer is able to improve the time-to-solution (the time spent to verify pointer memory safety)
Comparing to Clone-Hunter among all the testing benchmarks, with the highest up to 32.96% improvement of time-to-solution in bzip2.

4.4 Case Study: Removing Redundant Array Bound Checks

As mentioned in previous sections, Clone-Slicer proposes a memory safety verification mechanism after detecting code clones which can be further used in different engineering tasks. Here, we applied the kernel of Clone-Slicer for redundant bound checks removal task. We selected two representative benchmarks: bzip2 and sphinx3 to present the results. Figure 4 shows the process of redundant bound checks removal. We use Clone-Slicer on the top of binaries instrumented with bound checks and identify code clones with code similarity equaling to 0.90. Clone-Slicer is able to automatically verify whether bound checks are redundant in the code clones (if a binary symbolic execution raises no memory violation). Afterwards, we deploy a static binary rewriter Dyninst [37] to remove bound checks in binaries.

To evaluate the performance of Clone-Slicer, we employ a runtime bound checker tool: Softbound [31] to insert bound checks in the benchmarks. Figure 5 shows the comparison of Softbound’s runtime execution overhead before and after using Clone-Slicer. Our results show that Clone-Slicer is able to significantly reduce the runtime overheads caused by redundant array bound checks in both bzip2 and sphinx3. Clone-Slicer achieves the highest overhead reduction up to 42.25% in sphinx3.

5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we presented a novel framework, Clone-Slicer, a domain-specific code clone detector for binary executables, that integrates program slicing and a deep learning based binary code domain-specific code clone detector for binary executables, that integrates program slicing and a deep learning based binary code domain-specific code clone detector for binary executables. Our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art approach in terms of runtime overhead reduction and code clone detection rate. We evaluated our approach using real-world applications from SPEC 2006 benchmark suite. Our results show that Clone-Slicer is able to detect up to 43.64% code clones compared to prior work and further cut the time-to-solution (the time spent to verify memory bound safety) for Clone-Slicer by 32.96% compared to Clone-Hunter.

As future work, we plan to apply Clone-Slicer to different domains and tasks, such as vulnerable program path discovery, and further improve the capability for code clone detection through advanced clustering algorithms. We will also study the cost-benefit tradeoffs of using such advanced algorithms.

Acknowledgments

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References

Table 1: Comparison of execution time spent in Pure Symbolic Execution, Clone-Hunter and Clone-Slicer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>Program Size (Byte)</th>
<th>Pure Symbolic Execution Time Function-Level (sec)</th>
<th>Clone-Hunter assisted Symbolic Execution time (sec)</th>
<th>Clone-Slicer assisted Symbolic Execution time (sec)</th>
<th>Improvement of time-to-solution</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bzip2</td>
<td>305K</td>
<td>383.4</td>
<td>154.0</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>32.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbm</td>
<td>55K</td>
<td>1584.4</td>
<td>387.9</td>
<td>308.5</td>
<td>20.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hmmer</td>
<td>974K</td>
<td>6733.3</td>
<td>957.4</td>
<td>710.7</td>
<td>25.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sphinx3</td>
<td>1.3M</td>
<td>14010.0</td>
<td>6144.3</td>
<td>5202.2</td>
<td>15.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>